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Abstract. 
This paper considers whether incompatibilism, the view that negation is to 
be  explained  in  terms  of  a  primitive  notion  of  incompatibility,  and 
Fregeanism,  the  view  that  arithmetical  truths  are  analytic  according  to 
Frege’s definition of that term in §3 of Foundations of Arithmetic,  can be 
held together. Both views are attractive in their own right, in particular for 
a  certain  empiricist  mind-set.  They  promise  to  account  for  two 
philosophical puzzling phenomena: the problem of negative truth and the 
problem of epistemic access to numbers. For an incompatibilist, proofs of 
numerical  non-identities  must  appeal  to  primitive  incompatibilities.  I 
argue that no analytic primitive incompatibilities are forthcoming. Hence 
incompatibilists cannot be Fregeans.
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The Problem of Negation and Negative Truth 
Some philosophers find negation problematic. It is not difficult to appreciate why. 
Nothing really corresponds to negation. Nowhere do you encounter negativity: you 
do not perceive that the sky is not green, that there is no beer in the fridge, that this 
Riesling is not dry, that this is box does not weigh 5kg. You encounter just what is the 
case, not also what is not the case. What you see is that the sky is blue, you check 
what is in the fridge and there is only a bottle of wine, you taste the sweetness of the 
wine, you weigh the box and the scales’ indicator comes to rest at 3kg. There is only 
what there is, not also what there is not. So how can we speak truly about the world 
using negative propositions?1
The problem of negation or negative truth has been acutely felt by empiricists. For 
words to  be  meaningful,  they have to  denote  something positive,  as  all  that  we 
perceive is positive. Thus the meanings of negative expressions must be derivative of 
and stem from the meanings of positive ones, and negative truths must be secondary 
to and explained in terms of positive truths. Hobbes expresses this thought in his 
Elements of Philosophy: ‘The positive names are prior to the negative ones, because, 
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unless the former existed beforehand, there could be no use of the latter.’ (Hobbes 
2000,  Part  1,  Chapter 2,  §7)  Locke concurs and writes that  ‘negative or privative 
words cannot be said properly to belong to, or signify no ideas: for then they would 
be perfectly insignificant sounds; but they relate to positive ideas, and signify their 
absence.’ (Locke 1979: Book III, Chapter 1, §4) Ayer, grappling with the distinction 
between  negative  and  affirmative  statements,  concludes  that,  although  negative 
statements cannot be reduced to affirmative ones because the former are less specific 
than the latter, ‘logically a negative statement […] can be verified only through the 
truth of some more specific statement which entails it; a statement which will itself, 
by contrast,  be counted as affirmative.’  (Ayer 1952,  815) Ayer continues,  drawing 
attention to a metaphysical aspect of his conclusion, that ‘in the same way we can 
account  for  the  inclination that  many people  have towards saying that  reality  is 
positive. The explanation is that any information which is provided by a less specific 
statement  will  always  be  included  in  the  information  provided  by  some  more 
specific  statement.’  (Ibid.)  Ayer  describes  this  inclination  quite  neutrally,  which 
indicates that, although a particularly natural component of the empiricist line of 
thought, the view is attractive also before other metaphysical backgrounds. 
Incompatibilism
One attempt at explaining negative truth or negation in terms of positive notions is 
almost  immediately forthcoming.  If  the sky is  blue,  then it  is  not  green,  because 
being blue excludes it  from being green; if  the fridge is full  of wine, its contents 
exclude bottles of beer from being in it; the sweetness of the wine excludes it from 
being  dry;  if  something  weighs  only  3kg,  this  excludes  it  from  weighing  5kg. 
Negation can be explained in terms of what things are and what properties exclude 
each other or which properties are incompatible with each other. For ‘a is not F’ to be 
true, it suffices for a to have a property G which is incompatible with F. The puzzle 
dissolves, because negation is not a primitive concept, but one that is explained in 
terms of incompatibility. 
Demos offers an extended discussion of the problem of negation and its solution in 
terms of a primitive notion of incompatibility in an empiricist setting. According to 
Demos,  ’a  negative  proposition  constitutes  description  of  some  true  positive 
proposition in terms of the relation of opposition which the latter sustains to some 
other  positive  proposition’  (Demos 1917,  194),  where  opposition is  the  notion of 
incompatibility  introduced  in  the  last  paragraph.  More  recently,  Huw  Price  has 
argued in a similar spirit  that  ‘the apprehension of incompatibility [is]  an ability 
more  primitive  than  the  use  of  negation.’  (Price  1990,  226)  Price,  like  Demos, 
proposes to explain negation in terms of incompatibility: ‘It is appropriate to deny a 
proposition P (or assert ~P) when there is some proposition Q such that one believes 
that Q and takes P and Q to be incompatible.’  (Ibid. 231) I call the view that negation 
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is  to be explained in terms of  a primitive notion of  metaphysical  incompatibility 
incompatibilism.2
Let’s put some more flesh on incompatibilism. Russell reports that Wittgenstein once 
refused to accept that there was no hippopotamus in a lecture room in Cambridge. 
(Russell 1951, 297) Neither is there a hippopotamus in the room I am in now. Cheyne 
and Pigden explain that the ‘great big positive fact (or collection of facts)’ the room as 
it actually is makes it true that there is no hippopotamus in it. Their ‘claim is that the 
existence of this fact [...] necessitates or makes true the proposition that there is no 
hippopotamus in the room.’ (Cheyne and Pigden 2006, 255) Had there been a hippo 
in the room, that fact would not have existed. Containing intact furniture, books on 
shelves,  an unscathed philosopher etc.  is  incompatible  with a  room containing a 
hippo. The things or facts there are suffice to explain negative truths. As another 
example, suppose Theaetetus is not flying, but sitting next to Socrates. Then ‘the big 
fact (or collection of facts) that we can roughly characterize as Theaetetus as he actually 
is necessitates the truth of [Theaetetus is not flying]. For if Theaetetus were flying this 
fact  would  not  exist.  Thus  positive  facts  constituting  what  Theaetetus  is  doing 
necessitate negative truths about what he is not doing.’ (Ibid., 259) Negative truth is 
explained in terms of the things there are and what they exclude or with what they 
are incompatible.
Veber, too, emphasises that very large, positive facts, are the truthmakers of negative 
truths. ‘If the truth of Q is incompatible with the truth of P then P will entail Not-Q 
and thus P’s truthmaker will function as Not-Q’s truthmaker as well. Provided that 
every  negative  truth  is  entailed  by  some  set  of  positive  truths  with  positive 
truthmakers, negative truths can be made true by positive facts.’  (Veber 2008, 82) 
That neither the Great Wall of China nor a golf ball are in my coffee cup is due to 
certain positive facts. In the first case, ‘that the cup has certain dimensions and that 
the Wall has certain dimensions are metaphysically incompatible with the Wall being 
contained in the cup.’ (Veber 2008, 83) The dimensions of the cup and the Great Wall 
of China are positive facts. Concerning the golf ball and the cup, ‘truths about the 
distribution of air (or coffee) molecules inside the cup’ and what the golf ball is made 
of are incompatible with the golf ball being in the cup. Golf balls are made of ‘rubber 
or hard plastic’ and that ‘an air (or coffee) molecule is located in a certain place at a 
certain  time  is  incompatible  with  a  molecule  of  rubber  or  hard  plastic  being 
 Price appeals to a further primitive in his explanation of negation,  namely a primitive 2
speech  act  of  denial.  The  crucial  thought,  however,  is  that  negation  is  based  on 
incompatibility. Negation, according to Price, is needed only for pragmatic reasons, to enable 
speakers  to  register  explicitly  and  to  convey  to  other  speaker  that  they  consider  two 
propositions to be incompatible.  (Price 2019,  6)  Similarly,  Rumfitt appeals to a notion of 
incompatibility, albeit between speech acts, rather than propositions, in his bilateral account 
of logic. (Rumfitt 2000) Restall, too, appeals to a notion of incoherence, that of asserting and 
denying the same proposition. (Restall 2005, 6ff)
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there.’ (Veber 2008, 83) Thus only positive facts and what they are incompatible with 
are needed as the truthmakers of the negative truth that there is no golf ball in my 
coffee cup. 
The view that negation can be explained in terms of incompatibility is interesting, 
well motivated and attractive. To put it more sharply into focus and to illustrate the 
advantages of the incompatibilist view, let’s compare it briefly with the solution that 
Russell favoured at some point in his thinking: that there are negative facts.  3
Against Negative Facts
Russell  argued that there are two kinds of facts.  ‘Let us suppose, for the sake of 
illustration, that x has the relation R to y, and z does not have the relation S to w. 
Each of these facts contains only three constituents, a relation and two terms; but the 
two facts do not have the same form. In the one, R relates x and y; in the other, S does 
not  relate  z  and  w.  It  must  not  be  supposed  that  the  negative  fact  contains  a 
constituent corresponding to the word “not.” It contains no more constituents than a 
positive fact of the correlative positive form. The difference between the two forms is 
ultimate and irreducible. We will call this characteristic of a form its quality. Thus 
facts, and forms of facts, have two opposite qualities, positive and negative.’ (Russell 
1919a, 4) Russell argued that Demos’ view has no methodological advantage, and in 
fact some disadvantages, over the view that there are negative facts, and that it is 
circular, if the aim is to avoid negative notions, as incompatibility is itself negative. 
(Ibid., 5f) 
Not many philosophers are satisfied with the view that there are negative facts. Even 
Russell  himself  was  not  entirely  convinced:  in  The  Philosophy  of  Logical  Atomism, 
Russell is less committal and merely asks his audience to consider the possibility that 
there are negative facts in addition to positive ones. (Russell 1919b, 42) 
Demos aimed to  explain  negative  true  propositions  without  having to  introduce 
negative  facts.  According  to  Demos,  ‘the  reason  why  such  a  view  must  not  be 
entertained is the empirical consideration that strictly negative facts are nowhere to 
be met with in experience, and that any knowledge of a negative nature seems to be 
derived from perception of a positive kind.’ (Demos 1917, 189) A congenial view is 
expressed by Grzegorczyk in a paper giving an interpretation of intuitionist logic as 
the logic of scientific research: the atomic sentences of the language are established 
as true or otherwise by a method of enquiry, while ‘the compound sentences are not 
a product of experiment, they arise from reasoning. This concerns also negations: we 
see that the lemon is yellow, we do not see that it is not blue.’ (Grzegorczyk 1964, 
 The discussion of negative facts was added at the request of a referee. 3
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596)  The  negations  of  sentences  are  not  verified  directly,  but  their  verification 
involves reasoning.4
Another reason to reject the existence of negative facts is that for each positive fact 
there are uncountably many negative facts. There would be, besides the facts of the 
contents  of  my  room,  also  the  negative  facts  that  there  is  no  hippo  in  it,  no 
rhinoceros, no blackbird, no giraffe, besides the facts of its location, there would also 
be  the  negative  facts  that  it  is  not  in  Madrid,  not  in  Paris,  not  in  Berlin,  not  in 
Warsaw etc. etc.. That is just too many facts. It is a demand of ontological economy 
that if the phenomena can be explained without appeal to negative facts, then this is 
what we should do. Arguably, an account such as Cheyne’s and Pigden’s or Veber’s 
succeeds in doing precisely that, and so the existence of negative facts should be 
rejected. 
Another reason against accepting negative facts is the following. Suppose the cat is 
on the mat. Then that fact can be said to be located where the cat and the mat are. 
But suppose the cat is not on the mat. Where is the negative fact located? Where the 
cat is? Where the mat is? Where both are? Neither answer is particularly attractive. 
Negative facts  do not  appear  to  be located anywhere.  But  something that  is  not 
located  in  space  presumably  also  cannot  enter  the  causal  nexus  of  the  world. 
Negative facts would then not do any causal work and have no causal effects on the 
world, and as such, on plausible metaphysical assumptions about causality and the 
physical world, they would not be part of it. Negative facts would serve no purpose 
in the world, but they were introduced as supposedly on a par with positive facts, 
which undoubtedly serve a purpose.5
Incompatibilism is a view as general as the problem it aims to solve. The problem of 
negative truth isn’t one exclusively for empiricists. Some philosophers may simply 
share  the  sentiments  Mumford  expresses,  according  to  whom  negative  facts,  to 
which negative truths would appear to correspond, are ‘too mysterious to be taken 
seriously. [‘Everything that exists is positive’] has almost a ring of aprioricity about 
it. How can these facts exist and be negative? Indeed, how can any existent really be 
negative?’  (Mumford 2007,  49)  Mumford’s  description is,  just  like  Ayer’s  quoted 
earlier, quite neutral, which indicates that the problem is not specifically tied to a 
correspondence  theory  of  truth  either.  Existence  itself  seems  to  be  essentially 
positive. Nothing negative exists. The problem of negative truth is a very ancient 
and general one. A closely related problem, the problem of how there can be false 
speech or thought,  posed itself  already to Parmenides, who warns us that ‘never 
shall this be forcibly maintained, that things that are not are, but you must hold back 
your thought from this way of enquiry, nor let habit, born of much experience, force 
 I owe the reference to Grzegorczyk to a referee for this journal. 4
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you down this way, by making you use an aimless eye or an ear and tongue full of 
meaningless sound: judge by reason the strife-encompassed refutation spoken by 
me.’ (Kirk, Raven and Schofield, 248, Fragment 294) Parmenides concludes: ‘What is 
there to be said and thought must needs be: for it is there for being, but nothing is 
not.’  (Ibid.,  247,  Fragment  293)  But  then  ‘false  speech’  or  ‘false  thoughts’  are 
meaningless and neither speech nor thought at all. The ancient problem of falsity 
received profound systematic treatment and conceptual clarification by Plato. In the 
middle section of the Sophist, the Eleatic Stranger is lead to commit ‘the patricide of 
father Parmenides’ and to ‘insist by brute force both that that which is not somehow 
is,  and  then  again  that  that  which  is  somehow  is  not.’  (Plato  1997,  241d)  In  the 
Euthydemos,  Socrates  encounters  two  sophists  who  deny  the  possibility  of  false 
thoughts  and  disagreement.  Plato’s  vivid  presentation  of  the  perplexities 6
surrounding  negation,  falsity  and  negative  truth  challenges  philosophers  of  any 
background to address  the problem. The issues discussed here apply to  a  wider 
range  of  positions  than  just  some  forms  of  empiricism.  For  the  purposes  of 
illustration, however, I confine consideration to empirically minded philosophers.7
Fregeanism
Reference to and knowledge about numbers is also something many philosophers 
have found problematic, maybe even more so than negation. This, too, is a problem 
that is particularly acute for empiricists, for whom reference and knowledge must 
ultimately be explained in terms of sense perception and causal relations between 
speakers or thinkers and objects referred to or known about. We do not experience 
numbers in sense perception and we cannot stand in causal relations to them, as they 
are abstract objects. So how can we refer to them, let alone know anything about 
them? Maybe empiricists are even forced to admit that there are no numbers at all, 
 For  a  commentary  on  the  Euthydemos,  see  (McCabe  forthcoming).  I  comment  on  the 6
commentary in the same volume. 
 There  are  of  course  also empirically  minded philosophers  who have no problem with 7
negation. I have already mentioned Russell. Aristotle, too, has no qualms about appealing to 
negation in the formulation of the most certain and fundamental principle in Metaphysics 𝛤.
3, that ‘the same attribute cannot at the same time belong and not belong to the same subject 
in the same respect.’ (Aristotle 1985, 1005ba19-20) Mill also belongs to this group: ‘When the 
positive name is connotative, the corresponding negative name is connotative likewise; but 
in a peculiar way, connoting not the presence but the absence of an attribute. Thus, not-
white denotes all  things whatever except white things; and connotes the attribute of not 
possessing whiteness. For the non-possession of any given attribute is also an attribute, and 
may receive a name as such; and thus negative concrete names may obtain negative abstract 
names to correspond to them.’ (Mill 1882, 41f) For opposition to the incompatibilist account 
of  negation,  see (Armstrong 2004,  55ff),  (Kürbis  2019,  Chapter 4),  (Molnar 2000),  (Taylor 
1952) and (Taylor 1953). The last paper is a response to a paper of Ayer's on negation quoted 
earlier. For a commentary on Molnar’s paper, see (Kürbis 2018). 
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which makes the ubiquity, usefulness and applicability of propositions apparently 
about them even more of a mystery. 
Frege, although himself not touched by empiricist worries, formulated an attractive 
starting point for a solution. The logicist view that arithmetical truths are analytic 
opens up prospects for explaining how we manage to refer to numbers even though 
they are abstract objects by explaining numerical identities in terms of one-to-one 
correlations, or even of explaining away reference to numbers altogether. According 
to  the  characterisation  of  numerical  identity  that  Frege  attributes  to  Hume  in 
Foundations of Arithmetic §63, the number of Fs equals the number of Gs if and only if 
there is a one-to-one correspondence between the Fs and the Gs. Letting # abbreviate 
‘the number of’ and ∃! ‘there is exactly one’, what is often called Hume's Principle has 
the following formalisation: 
#xFx = #xGx ≡  ∃R (∀x(Fx → ∃!y(Gy & Rxy)) & ∀y(Gy → ∃!x(Fx & Rxy)))
For ease of exposition, we can additionally require that ∀x∀y(Rxy → Fx & Gy), so 
that R is a relation the domain of which are the Fs and the range of which are the Gs. 
Russell’s  version  of  logicism  was  sympathetic  to  empiricism.  Carnap  explicitly 
thought that logicism provides an approach to solving the problem of reference to 
numbers in an empiricist setting. Carnap describes how he ‘had learned from Frege 
that all mathematical concepts can be defined on the basis of the concepts of logic 
and that the theorems of mathematics can be deduced from the principles of logic. 
Thus the truths of mathematics are analytic in the general sense of truth based on 
logic alone. [...] It became possible for the first time to combine the basic tenet of 
empiricism  with  a  satisfactory  explanation  of  the  nature  of  logic  and 
mathematics.’ (Carnap 1963, 46f) Hale and Wright developed Frege’s thoughts in a 
direction  which,  although  they  themselves  may  not  be  motivated  purely  by 
empiricist worries either, can plausibly be appropriated by empiricists. Their aim is 
to explain ‘how statements of a given kind can be understood as involving reference 
to abstract objects and can yet remain, at least in principle, humanly knowable, given 
that the objects they concern are outside space and time and in consequence can 
stand in no sort of epistemologically relevant, causal relations to human knowers. 
[...] A statement of numerical identity---in the fundamental case, a statement of the 
kind: the number of Fs = the number of Gs---is true, if true, in virtue of the very same 
state  of  affairs  which  ensures  the  truth  of  the  matching  statement  of  one-to-one 
correspondence among concepts, and may be known a priori if the latter may be so 
known.’ (Hale and Wright 2002, 118f) Despite Frege’s own nonchalance regarding 
epistemological concerns, logicism provides philosophers reluctant to posit a special 
faculty of the mind to account solely for our capacity of reference to and knowledge 
about numbers, be it  Kantian or Gödelian intuition, with an attractive account of 
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how we, as physical beings situated in space and time, nonetheless manage to have 
epistemic access to numbers. 
In Foundations of Arithmetic, Frege also provided appealing definitions of a priori, a 
posteriori, synthetic and analytic: ‘It is necessary to find a proof [of a proposition] and 
to follow it down to the primitive truths. If in that process all that is met with are the 
general logical laws and definitions, then the truth is analytic [...] If, however, it is 
not possible to give a proof without appealing to truths which are not of the general 
logical  kind, but are related to a special  field of knowledge,  then the sentence is 
synthetic.  For  a  truth  to  be  a  posteriori  we  require  that  its  proof  cannot  proceed 
without appealing to facts, i.e. to unprovable truths without generality that contain 
statements about specific objects. If, on the other hand, it is possible to give a proof 
from purely general laws that can neither be proved nor stand in need of proof, then 
the truth is a priori.’ (Frege 1990, §3) For want of a better term, I shall call the view 
that arithmetical truths are analytic in Frege's sense  Fregeanism.  The terminology is 
not supposed to suggest that Fregeanism incorporates all of Frege’s philosophy. It is 
only a thesis on the nature of mathematical truths and the definitions of a priori, a 
posteriori, synthetic and analytic. In my terminology, Frege is of course a Fregean, but 
Fregeans need not accept all of Frege’s views. The most promising way of spelling 
out  Fregeanism  is  to  count  Hume’s  Principle  as  analytic,  but  philosophers  who 
accept Hume’s Principle as analytic need not be Fregeans in my terminology, if they 
do not accept Frege’s definition of analyticity. 
Fregeanism  is  independent  of  empiricism.  However,  as  Carnap’s  position  or  an 
empiricist Neo-Fregeanism are well motivated, for the purposes of this essay I am 
interested in an empirically minded Fregean. I do not require my empiricist to reject 
the  existence  of  abstract  objects  outright,  but  only  that  he  does  not  accept  their 
existence lightly: a philosopher who demands a strong argument, ideally a proof, 
before accepting the existence of a particular kind of abstract object, and hence who 
does  not  just  accept  that  there  are  numbers,  but  demands  that  this  must  be 
established.
Incompatibilist Fregeanism
Fregeanism and incompatibilism deserve and have received serious consideration. 
They  are  initially  plausible  and  provide  promising  ways  of  accounting  for 
philosophically  puzzling  phenomena,  especially  in  a  broadly  empiricist  setting. 
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Some  philosophers  may  wish  to  accept  both  views.  I  will  argue  that,  attractive 
though it is, this position is problematic.8
Consider ‘a is red and green all over’. By Frege's definition, it is neither synthetic nor 
analytic, neither a priori nor a posteriori, as it is not true: being red is incompatible 
with being green all over. Only true propositions are classified by Frege’s definition: 
false propositions do not have proofs, and to classify a proposition, it is necessary to 
find a proof of it,  says Frege. That is slightly unusual,  but it  is  merely a slightly 
unusual use of terminology. We can amend the definition by stipulating that false 
propositions belong to the same categories as their negations. 
The axioms of logic are a priori. Axioms of logic are propositions which can neither 
be proved nor do they stand in need of proof (from something else), while at the 
same time they are proved from purely general laws: they are their own one-step 
proofs. The same can be said of ‘Being red is incompatible with being green all over’. 
It is a primitive, general law expressing a truth that anyone who has mastered the 
concepts ‘red’ and ‘green’ is in a position to recognise. Thus it is a priori. But its (one-
step)  proof  is  related  to  a  special  field  of  knowledge,  namely  colours,  so  it  is 
synthetic.  Arguing indirectly, ‘Being red is incompatible with being green all over’ 9
cannot be anything but synthetic a priori. It is not a posteriori, as it does not contain 
reference to specific objects. It does not follow from only general logical laws and 
definitions, so it is not analytic. Assuming every truth can be classified by Frege’s 
definitions, it is synthetic a priori.
 My aim is to map out logical space and assess the general prospects for combining two 8
views, while avoiding the details of how any particular philosopher might combine them. 
The  possibility  of  combining  incompatibilism  and  Fregeanism  has  not  attracted  much 
attention  in  the  literature.  However,  Neil  Tennant  accepts  both,  logicism  and 
incompatibilism (see (Tennant 1987), (Tennant 1999) and (Tennant 2009)). Various members 
of audiences to whom I presented this paper have expressed sympathy for the combination. 
I'll  say  a  few words  about  Tennant  in  a  later  footnote.  Although Tennant’s  approach is 
attractive and elegant, discussing it in more detail here would distract from what is at issue. 
His  explanations  of  concepts  of  arithmetic  may  strike  some  readers  as  problematic  for 
reasons independent of my concerns in this paper, as he appears to define the concept ‘the 
number of’ and ‘0’ at the same time.
 This is plausible independently of Frege’s definitions. Maybe most people who accept that 9
there are synthetic a priori truths agree that ‘Being red is incompatible with being green all 
over’ is an example. On a Kantian definition, it is synthetic, because is incompatible with being 
green all over is ‘outside the concept’ being red and it ‘add[s] to the concept of the subject a 
predicate which has not been in any wise thought in it, and which no analysis could possibly 
extract  from  it.’  (Kant  2010,  A  7/B  11)  Having  grasped  the  concepts  red,  green  and 
incompatible suffices to grasp that being red is incompatible with being green. It is something 
that ‘our faculty of knowledge supplies from itself’, hence it is a priori. Besides, ‘Being red is 
incompatible with being green all over’ carries with it a kind of necessity that, according to 
Kant, a posteriori knowledge cannot have.
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If establishing the incompatibility of F and G appeals to a special field of knowledge 
concerning the properties F and G, then ‘Being F is incompatible with being G’ is 
synthetic a priori. Frege’s definitions assume that if there is a proof of a proposition, 
there is  one in which every step is  made explicit  according to the axioms of the 
system  and  the  additional  assumptions  necessary  to  derive  the  proposition.  If 
negation is defined in terms of incompatibility, any such fully analysed proof of a 
proposition  ~A  must  appeal  to  propositions  about  incompatibilities.  If  these 
propositions are synthetic, ~A itself is synthetic. 
A Fregean can employ an axiomatisation of logic in which negation is primitive. The 
incompatibilist needs to adopt one in which incompatibility is primitive. Proofs in 
second-order  logic  plus  Hume’s  Principle  remain  valid  for  the  incompatibilist 
Fregean,  but  they  require  analysis  into  more  basic  steps  where  any  appeal  to 
negation is replaced by an appeal to incompatibility. As by the Fregean definition 
fully analysed proofs are decisive for establishing whether a proposition is analytic 
or  synthetic,  a  priori  or  a  posteriori,  although  arithmetical  propositions  certainly 
remain a priori, because the newly analysed proofs will only appeal to purely general 
laws that  can neither  be proved nor  stand in need of  proof,  to  ensure that  they 
remain analytic, the incompatibilist Fregean needs to avoid appeal to propositions 
that refer to a specific field of knowledge. Incompatibilism is motivated by examples 
such as ‘Being red is incompatible with being green’, which involve properties of 
physical objects. These would not do for arithmetic, as arithmetic is not tied to the 
existence  of  colours.  An incompatibilist  could  extend the  account  of  negation  to 
arithmetic by appealing to primitive incompatibilities involving the numbers, such 
as ‘Being identical to 1 is incompatible with being identical to 2’. However, these 
appeal  to  a  special  field  of  knowledge,  namely  the  numbers,  and  thus  any 
proposition proved by appeal to them would be synthetic.  Thus this route is not 
open to the Fregean incompatibilist. The fundamental idea of Frege’s logicism was 
that  names referring to  numbers  are  not  primitive,  but  defined in  purely  logical 
terms.  In  other  words,  the  Fregean  incompatibilist  must  assume  that  there  are 
propositions of the form ‘Being F is incompatible with being G’ which are analytic, 
i.e. that there are purely logical properties that are incompatible with each other. 
Are there Analytic Incompatibilities? 
As numerical identities are explained in terms of Hume’s Principle, we might expect 
numerical non-identities to be provable on the basis of incompatibilities involving 
one-to-one mappings. Let’s consider an example of the kind Frege uses to motivate 
his account. Suppose you’re laying the table. You map the knives and forks one-to-
one onto each other and attempt to map them one-to-one onto the plates. You fail 
and  one  plate  is  left  over.  You  have  discovered  that  the  forks  and  knives  are 
equinumerous, but that the plates are not equinumerous to them. Trying to express 
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the non-identity ‘The number of plates is not identical to the number of knives’ in 
terms only of what things are and incompatibility, we could say that being that left 
over plate is incompatible with being mapped onto a knife and fork. Generalising, 
attempting to map Fs and Gs one-to-one onto each other leads sometimes to success, 
sometimes to frustration. If the number of Fs is not identical to the number of Gs, 
attempting to map the Fs one-to-one onto the Gs will always leave some Gs or Fs 
out. 
Arithmetic cannot be based on an activity of mapping, anymore than it can be based 
on the activity of laying the table. If we appeal to a mental faculty of carrying out 
such mappings or mathematical constructions in the abstract, it looks as if we once 
more  appeal  to  a  special  field  of  knowledge,  so  that  propositions  about 
incompatibilities between sizes of sets turn out to be synthetic. The incompatibilist 
Fregean  should  follow a  similar  path  to  Frege’s  and  use  the  example  as  purely 
heuristic to motivate a general account suitable for the foundations of arithmetic. 
Following this line of thought, the incompatibilist Fregean needs to specify purely 
logical primitive incompatibilities between sizes of sets that can be appealed to in 
establishing numerical non-identities. 
Let’s assume that there are more Gs than Fs. Then for any one-to-one relation R with 
the Fs as domain, for every F, there is exactly one G such that R relates them, but 
there are some Gs which are not identical to any of those that are related by R to an 
F.  The  incompatibilist  Fregean  needs  a  general  characterisation  of  one-to-one 
relations that map the Fs into but not onto the Gs in terms of incompatibility and 
without using negation. It must apply to all cases in which there is no one-to-one 
relation between Fs and Gs. Only then can we expect to be able to prove that such 
incompatibilities hold, independently of being able to carry out certain constructions 
or not. It is not enough to say that assuming there to be a one-to-one correlation 
entails two incompatible statements: what these might be is precisely the question 
we are trying to answer. The incompatibilities we are looking for need to be general, 
so we cannot rely on some characterisation involving the particular natures of the Fs 
and  the  Gs.  It  would  be  too  general  to  lay  down  that  ‘Being  one  of  the  Fs  is 
incompatible with being one of the Gs’, which is true if there are as many green as 
there are red things. We might try the following: If for any relation R, R’s being a 
one-to-one  mapping  onto  the  Fs  is  incompatible  with  R’s  being  a  one-to-one 
mapping onto the Gs, we can conclude that there is no one-to-one mapping of the Fs 
onto the Gs and that the number of Fs is not identical to the number of Gs. This, 
though, is not an incompatibility that can simply be appealed to in a proof: it is itself 
the kind of thing that stands in need of proof. 
Let’s go back to the heuristic point that some Gs are ‘left over’ by any one-to-one 
mapping R  of  the  Fs  into the Gs.  Being one of  those Gs  is  incompatible  with R 
mapping an F to it. This isn’t good enough, as we cannot always indicate the Gs, but 
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it  shows  that  we  need  to  draw  a  general  distinction  between  two  kinds  of  Gs: 
between those such that R maps some F to them and the others. The problem the 
incompatibilist  faces  is  that  they cannot  use negation,  as  we normally would,  to 
draw general distinctions. The most obvious differentiation between the two kinds 
of Gs is that one kind of G is such that R relates an F to them, while the other Gs are 
not of that kind, but that makes use of negation. We might try the following: being 
one of the Gs to which R relates an F is incompatible with being one of the other Gs. 
But that still requires a specification of a way of establishing the otherness of those 
Gs, and besides, what could ‘being other’ mean other than ‘not being identical to any 
of those’. As a final attempt, for any one-to-one relation R,  there is a G  such that 
being the value of R for an F is incompatible with being it. But even waiving worries 
about what ‘being incompatible with being it’ might mean, the problem remains of 
how to establish in general that this is the case for a given G.10
To  solve  these  difficulties,  the  incompatibilist  Fregean  might  introduce  a  further 
notion: difference. We can then say there are some Gs which are different from those 
Gs  such  that  R  relates  an  F  to  them.  Doing  so  is  of  course  to  admit  that 
incompatibility alone is insufficient, as a further primitive is needed for a satisfactory 
theory. More importantly, however, there is a crucial difference between difference 
and incompatibility. We have introduced ‘difference’ merely to avoid using ‘not’: it 
has no further content than ‘not identical’. By contrast, incompatibility is a rich and 
interesting  notion:  there  is  an  attempt  at  giving  it  content  independently  of  our 
interest in negation. The metaphysics of colours gives rise to some of them being 
incompatible  with  each  other.  Other  properties  exhibit  a  similar  phenomenon. 
Difference, on the other hand, appears to have no other content than non-identity 
and as an additional primitive it is just ‘not identical’ rewritten into one word. The 
move of adding a primitive notion of difference is rather desperate. It is either ad hoc 
or a thinly veiled appeal to negation.11
 Tennant’s system suffers from exactly this problem: his account of the ‘badness’ of ⊥ ties it 10
firmly to ‘various  ways that  we understand the  world  simply cannot  be’  (Tennant 1999,  217), 
which are synthetic truths. No attempt is made to specify any analytic absurdities. In his 
formalisation  of  arithmetic,  he  helps  himself  to  ⊥  in  the  rules  for  0  and for  one-to-one 
relations into, but not onto. ((Tennant 1987, 277ff), cf. also (Tennant 2009)). The rules are of 
course formulated generally, but this generality does not get us any further, if it only ranges 
over the examples of incompatibilities given by Tennant, which are synthetic a priori.
 One might even go further, as suggested by a referee, and observe that the statement that 11
R is a one-to-one correspondence between the Fs and the Gs involves an implicit appeal to 
negation: R maps different Fs to different Gs, and to say that x and y are different is to say 
that x and y are not identical, which appeals to negation. Thus right from the start, a logicism 
building  on  Hume’s  Principle  is  incompatible  with  incompatibilism.  However,  an 
incompatibilist  like  Tennant  would  deny  that  the  concept  of  one-to-one  correspondence 
implicitly appeals to negation, as negation is not appealed to in Tennant’s rules for one-to-
one correspondence: those rules are entirely positive.
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Contrary to expectation, one-to-one correspondences are not a promising source of 
analytic incompatibilities. But maybe there are others. Frege accepted that there are 
two logical  objects,  the  True and the  False,  so  that  T  =  F  is  a  logical  falsehood. 
However, such an approach is not congenial to an incompatibilist: if there are such 
objects,  we  might  as  well  define  negation  in  terms  of  them  rather  than 
incompatibility. It may be that an incompatibilist can accept the existence of these 
two logical objects, but then the burden of proof is clearly on the incompatibilist to 
provide such an account and establish its superiority over an account that begins 
with truth and falsity. 
There is a more general point here. The use of classical truth tables is not congenial to 
the  incompatibilist  account.  Classical  truth  tables  appeal  to  independently  given 
notions of  truth and falsity.  ‘A’  is  false if  and only if  ‘~A’  is  true,  hence anyone 
finding negation problematic will find falsity problematic, too. The incompatibilist 
aims to explain negation in terms of incompatibility: ~A is true if and only if there is 
some true proposition incompatible  with A.  The same explanation will  work for 
falsity, using the former equivalence. So on the incompatibilist account, falsity is to 
be explained, just like negation, in terms of incompatibility. Besides, Price observes 
that giving the meaning of negation in terms of its truth table also depends on a 
primitive notion of incompatibility, as it ‘clearly depends on our knowing that truth 
and falsity are incompatible.’ (Price 1990, 226) Nonetheless, incompatibilism is not 
biased  against  classical  logic.  The  references  to  Grzegorczyk  and Tennant  in  the 
current  paper  may  suggest  that  an  incompatibilist  view  is  more  congenial  to 
intuitionist, rather than classical, negation. There are, however, also incompatibilists 
who have no qualms about accepting classical logic. Price is one of them. Demos, 
Cheyne,  Pigden and Veber  express  no  hesitations  about  classical  logic.  Peacocke 
argues  that  his  explication  of  the  meaning  of  negation  in  terms  of  primitive 
incompatibility  validates  double  negation.  (Peacocke  1987,  163f)  Brandom  is  a 
further example of a classicist incompatibilist. (Brandom 2008, 126f)
According to an influential generalised treatment of negation discussed by Dunn, the 
negations  of  propositions  are  evaluated  in  terms  of  a  primitive  incompatibility 
relation ⊥ between states, situations or possible worlds: 
𝜒 ⊨ ~p if and only if  ∀𝛼(𝛼 ⊨ p implies 𝛼 ⊥ 𝜒)
Intuitively, ‘⊥  is  to be thought of as a kind of incompatibility relation, i.e.,  𝛼  ⊥  𝜒 
means that 𝛼 asserts something which 𝜒 denies.’ (Dunn 1993, 332) One might try to 
appropriate  this  explanation  to  the  present  case  to  search  for  analytic 
incompatibilities, and say that 𝛼 ⊥ 𝜒 holds in case 𝛼 and 𝜒 contain propositions that 
are metaphysically incompatible. This, however, this still leaves the crucial question 
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unanswered.  ~p  will  only  count  as  analytically  true  at  a  world  𝜒  if  the 
incompatibility  relation  amongst  worlds  may  hold  as  a  matter  of  analytically 
incompatible  propositions  being  asserted  at  each  world.  So  unless  analytic 
incompatibilities  are  forthcoming  independently  of  the  definition  of  when  the 
negation of a proposition is true at a world, so that we can say that there are cases 
where 𝛼  asserts a proposition that is analytically incompatible with a proposition 
that 𝜒 asserts, the definition is not going to produce analytically true negations.12
Another option for an analytic incompatibility might be ‘Everything is identical to 
everything’.  For Frege, at  least,  this is a logical falsehood that can be formulated 
without using negation. It is false because there are at least two objects, the True and 
the False. Even better, Hume’s Principle entails that there are infinitely many objects. 
But this is  not a suitable answer for an incompatibilist  Fregean.  The reason why 
‘Everything is identical to everything’ is logically false is that there are at least two 
different objects. Hume’s Principle only entails the existence of infinitely many objects 
if  we have  a  means  of  expressing that  there  are  different  objects,  and the  proof 
appeals to negation in the definition of 0 as the number of things equinumerous to 
the non-self-identical ones. Even if we contrived a new concept ‘being incompatible 
with  being  itself’,  this  still  leaves  the  question  of  how  to  secure  that  being 
equinumerous to the objects falling under that concept is not equinumerous to the 
number of things falling under the concept ‘identical to 0’.  As argued, adding a 13
primitive notion of difference to secure this is unconvincing.
As a final attempt,  one might observe that in second order logic it  is  possible to 
express  logical  falsehoods  without  using  negation,  as  the  falsum  constant  ⊥  is 
definable as ∀p . p, and that it is possible to prove that there are at least two different 
concepts  or  properties,  one  under  which  everything  falls  and  one  under  which 
nothing false, so that ‘All concepts are identical’ or ‘All properties are identical’ can 
serve  as  an  analytic  falsehood that  does  not  appeal  to  negation.  The  crux  here, 
however, as before, lies with ‘different’. ‘All concepts are identical’ or ‘All properties 
are identical’ is absurd only if there are two different concepts or properties, that is to 
say, two concepts or properties that are not identical. Besides, to say that there is a 
concept  under  which  nothing  falls  blatantly  appeals  to  negation.  That  all 
propositions  are  true  is  also  absurd  only  if  there  are  at  least  two  different 
propositions,  one  true  and  one  false,  or  one  incompatible  with  the  other.  The 14
former may be true as a matter of logic, but it relies on the notion of difference, hence 
 The discussion of Dunn was added in response to a request by a referee.12
 Cook and Cogburn make a related point that defining ~A as A → 0=1 is not sufficient, as 13
there are acceptable intuitionist theories that verify the Peano Axioms, but also 0=1. (Cook 
and Cogburn, 10f) 
 For further discussion of an attempt to define negation in terms of ⊥, see (Kürbis 2015). 14
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negation, and besides, it appeals once more to independently given notions of truth 
and falsity, which, as argued, is no good for the incompatibilist Fregean. The latter 
option just reiterates the problem: those two incompatible propositions would have 
to be analytically incompatible to be of use to the incompatibilist Fregean, and we 
have not been able to find any such propositions. 
Conclusion
No analytic incompatibilities are forthcoming. The conclusion suggests itself that the 
only propositions that are analytically incompatible are analytic propositions and 
their negations.  But this is no good for the incompatibilist Fregean, who aims to 15
define  negation  in  terms  of  incompatibility  and  is  in  need  of  analytic 
incompatibilities for the foundations of  mathematics.  So it  looks very much as if 
incompatibilism is incompatible with Fregeanism. 
I conclude that Fregean incompatibilism, if not incoherent, has tricky questions to 
answer. The burden of proof is certainly on the Fregean incompatibilist to make the 
case that the position is tenable. Of course, it would be possible to adopt different 
definitions of ‘analytic’ and ‘synthetic’. But that would not change the fact that much 
of arithmetic on an incompatibilist account would turn out to be synthetic according 
to Frege’s definition. And hasn’t Frege himself given good reasons against taking 
arithmetic to be synthetic according to his definition? 
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